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INTRODUCTION 
The race model has been the darling of patent economists and 
game theorists.1 This model assumes that the winner, namely the first 
to invent, takes the patent grant with the market dominance that 
comes with it, whereas the second comer, in the best tradition of 
sports contests, obligingly accepts her loss and quietly vanishes from 
the scene. While the sports analogy has provided a useful framework 
for understanding the economics of invention, it has obfuscated an 
important aspect of the inventive process: the possibility of strategic 
publication of research findings in order to prevent the issuance of a 
patent to a competitor. Captured by the sports analogy, patent schol­
ars have consistently presupposed that the loser of a patent race must 
behave in a sportsmanlike fashion and gracefully accept her fate. But 
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. LL.B 1994, Hebrew Univer­
sity of Jerusalem; LL.M. 1995, Boalt Hall School of Law; J.S.D. 1998, Yale Law School. -
Ed. I am indebted to Ian Ayres, Talia Bar, Avi Bell, Jenny Lanjouw, Peter Siegelman, Jill 
Fisch, Zahar Goshen, Yael Lustmann, Steve Thel, Joel Reidenberg, Ben Zipursky, Mark 
Patterson, Hugh Hansen, and participants at the business law seminar at Fordham Law 
School for invaluable comments and contributions. 
1. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-414 
(1988); ERIC RASMUS EN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 341-48 (2d ed. 1994); see also 
Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, 11 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 139 (1993); 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R&D: Patent Protection and Competitive Be· 
havior, 50 ECONOMETRICA 671 (1982); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, In· 
dustria/ Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Tom Lee & Louis L. 
Wilde, Market Structure and Innovation: A Refonnulation, 94 QJ. ECON. 429 (1980); Glenn 
C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 QJ. ECON. 395 (1979). 
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there is no reason whatsoever why competition in the inventive field 
should conform to the rules of sports.2 
The stakes and payoff matrices of patent races are considerably 
different from those of sports contests, and, thus, it is only natural to 
expect firms in a patent race to deviate from the norms of fair compe­
tition in sports. The nature of patent races is much more complex 
than that of other races. Ceding a patent to a competitor may often 
spell a substantial drop in revenues for the losing firm, and in some 
cases may even drive the loser out of the market.3 Therefore, trying to 
win the race may not always be the profit-maximizing strategy. 
Rather, in many patent races the superior strategy for one or more of 
the competing firms would be to prevent other firms from winning the 
race by publishing their research findings. Recharacterizing patent 
races in this way implies that firms that are about to lose in a patent 
race often face a dilemma all too familiar to academics, the choice of 
"publish or perish." 
The possibility of preemptive publication inheres in every patent 
system. The point and purpose of the patent grant is to reward inno­
vation.4 Yet, not all types of innovation are eligible for reward: only 
inventions that constitute a nontrivial contribution over the prior art 
qualify for patent protection.5 This trait of patent protection intro­
duces an important element of relativity into the patent system, turn­
ing the prior art into the reference point against which new patents are 
evaluated. Thus, firms have the power to affect the patentability of 
their rivals' inventions by altering the state of the prior art. Because 
any publication immediately becomes part of the prior art, the strategy 
of preemptive publication allows a firm to render an otherwise 
nonobvious invention obvious and, as a result, unpatentable. Re­
turning momentarily to the sports analogy, it can be said that preemp-
2. Preemptive publication may also be useful to firms - whether in a race or not - that 
do not wish to incur the considerable cost of obtaining a patent, but want to retain free ac­
cess to their R&D. In the same vein, preemptive publication is useful to firms estimating 
that a competitor is about to patent one of the publishing firm's trade secrets. Publishing, in 
this case, will enable the firm to keep using the process or innovation. 
3. A case in point is the famous race between Amgen and Genetic Institute over the 
exclusive right to market erythropoietin (EPO) in the United States. Each of the companies 
patented the technique it developed for producing EPO and sued the other for infringing its 
patent. At trial, the court held the patents of both companies not invalid and infringed. See 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989). On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that while Amgen's patent was indeed valid and 
infringed, Genetic Institute's patent was invalid. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 
Ltd., 927 F2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This decision effectively granted the United States 
EPO market to Amgen. 
4. Or, in the language of the Constitution, "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. 
5. See Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880) ("[A]ll improvement is not invention, 
and entitled to protection as such."). 
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tive publication shifts the goalpost of patentability, or, more accu­
rately, raises the patentability bar. 
A simple example may help illustrate the point. Assume that two 
firms, A and B, compete for a new computer chip. Suppose that A has 
an invention that is a clear improvement over prior art - say, a chip 
design that is 10% faster than the best chip now available. Although, 
in principle, A's invention is eligible for a patent, B's involvement in 
the race may block the patent to A. B can prevent A from obtaining 
the patent by publishing its design for a 5% faster chip, which, al­
though it is not enough to procure a patent for B, is enough to block 
A's innovation, making it no longer a significant improvement over 
prior art. 
The Patent Act employs two mechanisms to ensure that only in­
ventions constituting a real inventive leap over the prior art are re­
warded: novelty and nonobviousness. The novelty requirement, as 
embodied in § 102, denies patentability to inventions that were known, 
used, or described in a printed publication or a patent application at 
any time prior to filing.6 The nonobviousness requirement, codified in 
§ 103, reinforces the novelty requirement by limiting patentability to 
inventions that truly enhance social utility.7 Together these require­
ments ensure the basic tradeoff patent law seeks to promote: disclo­
sure of substantially new information in exchange for a limited mo­
nopoly grant. At the same time, they also enable the strategy of 
preemptive publication. 
While the novelty and nonobviousness requirements make the 
strategy of preemptive publication theoretically possible, the nature of 
the inventive process itself makes it practically feasible. From a prac­
tical standpoint, the strategy of preemptive publication is made possi­
ble by the lag that exists between the time a firm obtains sufficient re­
search results to effect a change in the prior art and the time it perfects 
the invention. Under the "first to invent" rule that prevails in the 
United States, the first firm to reduce an invention to practice is enti­
tled, as a general rule, to patent protection.8 An invention can be re­
duced to practice either constructively or actively. A constructive re-
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 {1994). 
7. See 3 5  U.S.C. § 103 {1994). 
8. For a classic statement of the priority rule, see Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69 {6th Cir. 
1893). Unless the inventor can prove an earlier date, the date of filing is considered the date 
of reduction to practice for purposes of priority. See id. at 7 5 .  The only exception to the 
general rule stated above is a case in which the second to reduce to practice can show: (1) 
that she conceived the invention first; and (2) that she was reasonably diligent in reducing 
her invention to practice. See id. at 76. The practical importance of the exception has 
proven to be rather miniscule. The process by which priority between two inventors is being 
determined in such cases is called "interference." Historically, only 0.1 % of the applications 
required. an interference process, and of those, the "junior party," the second to file, pre­
vailed in fewer than 0 33%. See Ian A. Calvert & Michael Sofocleous, Interference Statistics 
for Fiscal Years 1992to1994, 17 J. PAT. [&TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 417, 421 tbl.4 {1995). 
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duction to practice occurs when the patent application is filed. An ac­
tive reduction requires a showing that at some earlier date the inven­
tion actually "work[ed] for its intended purpose."9 Thus, a firm that 
elects to pursue a patent must develop a "working model" of the in­
vention. By contrast, a firm that chooses to publish need only possess 
certain theoretical results that enable the invention, and sometimes 
even less. Any publication of results may, in principle, raise the 
nonobviousness standard enough to spoil a patent for a competitor. 
The ability to adversely affect the patentability of rivals' inventions 
through publication explains the otherwise peculiar practice of com­
mercial firms that routinely publish research results in scientific and 
technological journals. While firms engaging in research and devel­
opment ("R&D") ultimately wish to obtain patent protection, their 
research results often fall short of supporting a patent application. In 
many cases research does lead to improvements over the prior art, but 
those improvements are insufficient to satisfy the . nonobviousness 
standard. Although minor improvements over the prior art cannot se­
cure a patent grant, they are by no means valueless. The publication 
of such results alters the chances of rival firms reaching the patent 
mark and is, thus, of value to the publishing firm. 
A firm will choose to publish its research results whenever it be­
lieves - correctly or incorrectly10 - that its competitors are likely to 
beat it to the patent application. Three reasons might account for such 
a belief. First, a firm may estimate that its rivals are at a more ad­
vanced stage in their research, either because they started earlier or 
because their human resources are superior. Second, due to imperfect 
9. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A, 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The United 
States is the only country in the world that follows the "first-to-invent" rule; all other coun­
tries have adopted the "first-to-file" rule, which determines priority between inventions ac­
cording to the date of filing, regardless of who invented first. The United States has consis­
tently declined the invitation to join tlte rest of tlte world by adopting a "first-to-file"  rule. 
Yet, tlte pressure to effect tltis change persists. Several commentators have suggested tltat 
switching to a "first-to-file" rule will have virtually no practical implications. See, e.g., 
Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, AD., 38 IDEA 
529, 549 (1998) (arguing tltat "tlte United States now has a virtual first-to-file system"). 
However, switching to a "first-to-file"  rule does have an important implication when tlte 
possibility of preemptive publication is considered. The "first-to-file" rule extends tlte pe­
riod during which a preemptive publication is possible, and tltus gives an advantage to in­
tended publishers over intended patentees. 
10. Because firms in a patent race operate in an environment of imperfect information, 
tltey may have an incorrect belief as to one or more of tlte following factors affecting tlte 
publication decision. First, a firm may wrongly believe tltat it is involved in a patent race, 
whereas in fact it is not. This can happen, for instance, when two firms compete for a new 
drug for treating a certain disease, but each of tltem is developing a different product. Sec­
ond, a firm may be incorrect in assessing its ability to beat its competitors to tlte sought-after 
patent. Finally, a firm may be incorrect in overestimating tlte research skills, or tlte success, 
of its competitors. Therefore, a firm may sometimes decide to publish even tltough it is not 
in its best interest to do so. The possibility of reaching a mistaken decision weakens to some 
extent tlte incentive to publish, but it does not elintinate it altogetlter. It is just anotlter fac­
tor a firm must take into account in deciding on an appropriate strategy. 
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access to financial markets, a firm may believe that other firms are 
able to obtain financing at a lower cost and, as a consequence, file for 
a patent more quickly. Finally, and relatedly, a firm may prioritize its 
research projects in a way that prevents it from fully engaging in a par­
ticular patent race. In all these instances a firm may find it in its best 
interest to become a spoiler by resorting to the strategy of preemptive 
publication. 
Preemptive publication offers two important benefits. First, it pre­
vents a rival firm from acquiring an important competitive edge. Pre­
emptive publication enables the publishing firm to block a rival from 
obtaining a patent and thereby maintain its market position. Fur­
thermore, if the rival firm expended more money on R&D in an at­
tempt to win the patent race, preemptive publication would give the 
publishing firm a relative advantage over its competitor. Although 
sunk costs do not on their own affect the relative positions of the firms 
vis-a-vis present projects, it may affect their financial ability to engage 
in other research projects in the future. Second, preemptive publica­
tion allows the publishing firm to use the information it published in 
future projects at no cost. In the absence of such a publication, the 
patent bars all others from using the information disclosed in the pat­
ent application without a license from the winning firm. Preemptive 
publication obviates the need to negotiate such a license. Further­
more, preemptive publication makes it possible for the publishing firm 
to eventually obtain a patent on variants of the original invention -
or, as they are called in the jargon of patent law, "improvements." 
This Article explores the strategy of preemptive publication in 
patent races and evaluates its welfare implications. In particular, this 
Article offers three novel insights. First, it demonstrates, contrary to 
prevailing theory, that the strategy of preemptive publication some­
times dominates the strategy of attempting to win the patent race. An 
important implication is that firms engaged in a patent race can make 
a credible threat of publishing their research results and thereby force 
the likely patentee to negotiate a licensing agreement with them prior 
to receiving the patent.11 Significantly, this result alters the prevailing 
understanding of patent races as "winner take all" games because 
even second comers may indirectly obtain a share of the patent grant. 
Second, and relatedly, this Article shows that recourse to preemptive 
publication can lead to an equilibrium in which none of the competing 
firms receives a patent. However, no patent will issue in such cases 
not because the desirable invention cannot be produced, but rather 
because the knowledge underlying the invention had been made pub­
lic before its completion. Finally, the Article argues that preemptive 
11. Such licensing agreements may have antitrust implications, depending on the impor­
tance of the invention and the market positions of the parties involved. A detailed discus­
sion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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publication is likely to promote economic efficiency in industries, such 
as biotechnology, that depend on access to basic research, and in net­
work markets since it makes valuable information available to the 
public without the attendant cost of limited monopoly. 
In addition, the normative analysis in this Article indicates that an 
innovation policy that overlooks the option of preemptive publication 
will be suboptimal in that it will set the obviousness standard too high. 
A high obviousness standard is socially desirable as it sifts out trivial 
innovations from meaningful ones, but at the same time it increases 
the opportunity for preemptive publication and may thus unduly di­
minish the incentive to innovate. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the economic 
rationale underlying preemptive publication and the legal rules ena­
bling it. Part II constructs a formal model to explain when firms will 
choose to publish their research findings and then sets forth the condi­
tions under which preemptive publication dominates the strategy of 
regular competition for a patent. Part III analyzes the welfare effects 
of preemptive publication. Finally, Part IV introduces and explores 
the possibility of "the double preemption twist" - a defensive ma­
neuver in which the anticipated winner of the patent race publishes 
first to shield itself from preemptive publication by a rival. 
I. THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL RULES OF PATENT RACES 
The optimal strategy for a firm in a patent race is to maximize its 
expected profits in all possible states of the world. In the present con­
text, the two relevant states are: a world with patent protection, and a 
world without. Given that the issuance of a patent is a probabilistic 
event that depends on the research skills of the firm, its investment 
level, and often on luck, no firm can rationally assume thatit is going 
to win every patent race in which it engages. Consequently, in many 
cases the best strategy for firms is not to try to win every patent race 
they enter, but, rather, to quit the race and maximize their profits 
without patent protection.12 
Curiously, existing models of patent races have focused exclusively 
on the option of winning the patent and, as a result, have overlooked 
the important ramifications of losing a patent race.13 Yet, no profit-
12. It is important to note that the investment in R&D is a sunk cost that a firm engaged 
in a patent race necessarily incurs regardless of the strategy it chooses to pursue. 
13. Of the various race models, the most influential is the "memoryless model" of 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz. See Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 1. The model assumes identical 
firms with continuous investment in R&D. Furthermore, it assumes that the probability of 
making a patentable breakthrough depends only on a firm's current decisions as to R&D 
investment - past investments that failed to yield a patentable invention are completely 
wasted. Although this assumption is rather unrealistic, it has become the standard assump­
tion in the economic literature on patent races. See De Fraja, supra note 1, at 141. 
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maximizing firm can afford to do the same - losing a patent race en­
tails not only a loss of considerable investment in R&D, but also a 
substantial drop in profits because its rival can introduce a superior 
product in the market. Thus, at any point in time following the initial 
decision to join a patent race, a firm would choose to pursue the op­
tion of patenting only if it estimates that the expected payoff from 
patenting is higher than the expected payoff from quitting the race and 
publishing its research findings. Or, formally, a firm would continue in 
a race, IFF pwin *(Net ProfitlWin) > Piose *(Net Profit!Lose ). 
Importantly, a firm's probability of winning a patent race is en­
dogenous to the race itself - victory is contingent not only on the 
firm's ability to successfully complete the invention, but also on its 
ability to do so before the other entrants in the race. Thus, the ex­
pected payoff of a firm in a patent race depends to a large extent on 
the research results of its rivals. Naturally, if a firm estimates that its 
likelihood of winning the race is higher than that of all other firms, it 
should generally compete to the end.14 If, on the other hand, a firm es­
timates that its probability of winning is lower than that of even one of 
its competitors, then its optimal strategy changes radically. Rather 
than maximizing its investment in R&D in an attempt to preserve its 
lead in the race, a firm estimating that it will lose should attempt to 
maximize its expected profits in the absence of patent protection. 
Such polarized profit-maximizing strategies are dictated by the very 
nature of patent races, which rewards only the first-comer while of­
fering no consolation prizes to second-comers. 
Preemptive publication is probably the most powerful defensive 
strategy a firm can employ in the face of an imminent reduction to 
practice by a competitor. Rather than conceding a loss and allowing a 
competitor to gain monopoly power in a certain product or process 
market, a firm in possession of sufficient research results15 can bar its 
competitor from obtaining the patent by publishing the information it 
holds. The possibility of preemptive publication derives from the very 
principles animating the patent system, which is predicated on a fun­
damental tradeoff of information for limited monopoly power.16 Be­
cause patents come at a cost to society, the patent system rewards only 
new inventions; granting a patent to an already existing invention 
makes no economic sense.17 Furthermore, even if an invention is 
14. The analysis in this Article shows, however, that even a firm estimating that its 
probability of winning is higher than that of all other firms should not always attempt to win 
the patent since it remains exposed to the risk of preemptive publication. 
15. For a discussion of what constitutes "sufficient research results," see infra text ac­
companying notes 22-23. 
16. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989). 
17. See DONALD s. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 335 (1998). 
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novel, it may nevertheless be ineligible for a patent if it is anticipated 
by the prior art. Thus, to qualify for a patent, an invention must make 
a meaningful contribution to the existing pool of knowledge18 and be 
considerably different from the prior art.19 The Patent Act pursues 
this policy through the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. 
The novelty requirement denies patent protection to an invention 
that was known, used, or described in a printed publication, in the 
United States or elsewhere before the date of invention. Accordingly, 
any printed publication preceding the date of invention, even by the 
slightest of margins, will suffice to bar an invention from receiving a 
patent. However, a publication does not necessarily have to describe 
an invention identical to the one for which a patent is sought in order 
to block it from obtaining a patent; all that the publication must do is 
render the invention obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art. 
Aptly described as the "final gatekeeper of the patent system," 20 the 
nonobviousness requirement withholds patent protection from minor 
improvements.21 The nonobviousness requirement ensures that only 
meaningful innovation - innovation that represents a sufficiently 
large technical advance over the prior art22 - is rewarded by the pat­
ent system. Thus, if the prior art renders a particular invention trivial, 
the innovation is ineligible for a patent. 
The interdependence between the patentability of new inventions 
and the state of the prior art creates a unique opportunity for firms to 
affect the patentability of their rivals' invention not by competing with 
them "head on" for the patent grant, but rather by altering the state of 
the prior art. To see this clearly, it is helpful to quantify the nonobvi­
ousness requirement in terms of innovation increments.2 3 For exam­
ple, one could imagine a patent system in which inventors are required 
to improve upon the prior art by 10 innovation increments in order for 
an invention to be patentable. Under this rule, whenever a firm esti-
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 335, 531. 
20. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 479 (2d ed. 1997). 
21. The nonobviousness examination, as formulated by the Supreme Court in the land­
mark case of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), consists of three steps. First, the 
court has to determine "the scope and content of the prior art." Then, it must identify "the 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue." Finally, the court has to deter­
mine the "level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art" at the time the invention was made and 
decide whether the claimed invention would have been obvious at the time of invention to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 17. 
The Court added that the nonobviousness determination may be aided by "secondary 
considerations" such as "commercial success, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, 
etc., [that] might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the 
subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at 17-18. 
22. See MERGES, supra note 20, at 479. 
23. I am indebted to Ian Ayres for this idea. 
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mates that its rival is about to attain the requisite 10-increment stan­
dard, it can publish some information that improves the state of the art 
by 1 innovation increment, thereby spoiling its rival's plan to obtain a 
patent. Of course, nonobviousness is difficult to quantify in the real 
world, but the more general point remains valid: preemptive publica­
tion enables firms to play the role of the spoiler by raising the patent­
ability bar. 
To be sure, not every reference to an invention in a written publi­
cation will render the invention unpatentable.24 Only a reference that 
contains an enabling disclosure of an invention negates patentability. 
Technically, this has been accomplished by the importation of the en­
ablement requirement of § 112 into the novelty standard of § 102.25 
Under § 112, a publication is considered enabling if it discloses suffi­
cient information to allow a person skilled in the art to produce the in­
vention.26 Thus, to constitute a bar to patentability, a reference must 
describe an invention in sufficient detail and accuracy; a merely sug­
gestive reference will not do. 
While the requirement of enabling disclosure restricts to some ex­
tent the ability of firms to preemptively publish their research results, 
it by no means eliminates it. The publishing firm enjoys four advan­
tages over the patenting firm. First, any publication sufficiently acces­
sible to the public interested in the art qualifies as a prior art refer­
ence.27 A publication need neither pass exacting peer review nor be 
published in a prominent scientific or technological journal; even a 
publication in the firm's own journal will suffice if the public may ac­
cess it.28 Second, and relatedly, publications are not subject to strict 
24. Adopting such a rule would dramatically undermine the incentive to engage in R& D 
and, thus, would diminish social welfare. 
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
26. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870) (holding that in or­
der to constitute an anticipatory reference, a publication must "contain and exhibit a sub­
stantial representation of the patented improvement, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, to make, construct, and 
practice the invention"); see also Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 
804 F.2d 659, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[E]ven if the claimed invention is disclosed in a printed 
publication, that disclosure will not suffice as prior art if it was not enabling."); ARTIIUR R. 
MILLER &MICHAE LH. DAVIS, INTELLECTUALPROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL46, 47 (1983). 
27. See Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) ("If accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show that particular members of 
the public actually received the information."). 
28. See, for example, In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in which the Federal 
Circuit stated that public accessibility is the "touchstone in determining whether a reference 
constitutes a 'printed publication.' " A review of the case law reveals that indexing is the key 
factor in determining public accessibility. For example, in In re Hall, the court held that a 
doctoral dissertation that had been deposited and indexed in a German library was suffi­
ciently accessible to constitute a printed publication. See id. at 899-900. By contrast, in In re 
Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A 1978), it was held that a thesis that had been catalogued but 
not indexed could not serve as a prior art reference. 
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examination of the Patent Office �-d thus need not be as accurate and 
specific as patent applications. .Cop.sequently, the publishing firm 
may, in principle, offer several ways to produce an invention, thereby 
increasing the probability of preemption. Third, even a publication 
that does not, on its own, trivialize an invention may still make it un­
patentable in combination with other prior art references.29 Thus, all a 
publication need to do is contribute the "marginal obviousness incre­
ment" to the prior art in order to block a patent. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the publishing firm is favored by the "hindsight 
bias." 
The hindsight bias is a cognitive effect that causes people to "exag­
gerate what could have been anticipated in foresight ... [and] to view 
[what has happened] as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before 
it happened." 30 Significantly, empirical studies in cognitive psychology 
have repeatedly demonstrated that as a consequence of the hindsight 
bias, we tend to overestimate, ex post, the ex ante predictability of 
events that actually occurred.31 Although no empirical tests have been 
29. The permissibility of combining references is what distinguishes the obviousness in­
quiry from the novelty inquiry. As Judge Lourie explicated in Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. 
Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 15 F3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996): 
If one prior art reference describes the claimed invention, it is worse than obvious in terms 
of patentability; it lacks novelty. If the invention is different from what is disclosed in one 
reference, but the differences are such that combination with another reference would lead 
to what is claimed, the obviousness question then requires inquiry into whether there is rea­
son, suggestion, or motivation [in the prior art] to make that combination. 
Id. at 1573. Thus, courts will not automatically combine prior art references when making an 
obviousness determination, but rather look to other factors existent at the time. Such a sug­
gestion may be explicit, see, e.g., In re Semaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1983), or im­
plicit, see, e.g., In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1988), in the prior art literature. 
It may also derive from the knowledge of those skilled in the relevant art, see, e.g., Ashland 
Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or from 
the nature of the problem to be solved, see, e.g., In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1054 
{C.C.P.A. 1976). 
30. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in 
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 {Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
31. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight [not =] Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXP. PSYCHOL, 288 {1975) (first to identify 
the hindsight bias); see also Jay JJ. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The 
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 147, 147-48 (1991); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judg­
ments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312 {1990); 
Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post¢ Ex Ante, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 
{1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight 
Bias, 20 LA w & HUM. BEHA v. 501 {1996). For possible ways to eliminate the hindsight bias 
in legal, and other settings, see, for example, Hal R Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight 
Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306 {1988); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523-33 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 615 (1998); 
David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in 
Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHA v. SCI. & L. 
485, 496 {1989). 
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conducted to evaluate the influence of the hindsight bias on nonobvi­
ousness determinations,32 its applicability to such determinations is in­
disputable. Indeed, the case law on nonobviousness reveals that 
courts have been especially conscious of not falling prey to the hind­
sight bias,33 even looking to objective criteria - such as the commer­
cial success of the invention - in an attempt to avoid it.34 Yet, there is 
no proof that the courts' cautionary approach has helped in overcom­
ing the hindsight bias. Between 1982 and 1 994, the Federal Circuit in­
validated approximately 30% of the patents litigated before it for lack 
of novelty or obviousness, even though they had been approved by the 
Patent Office.35 Furthermore, several leading commentators have ob­
served that the correlation between the secondary considerations used 
by the courts and the nonobviousness of inventions may often be quite 
tenuous.36 Thus, it seems, at the end of the day, that the hindsight bias 
still gives potential "publishers" an important advantage over poten­
tial patentees. 
II. PATENT RACES WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION 
This Part demonstrates that preemptive publication may dominate 
the strategy of pursuing a patent in all race settings. Broadly speaking, 
there can be two types of race settings: symmetric races and asymmet­
ric races. A race is symmetric when the two competing firms are iden­
tical in their research capabilities, financing capabilities, and timing 
decisions. A race is asymmetric when one of the competing firms has 
32 See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 614. 
33. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prod. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction .... "); Panduit 
Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is not appropriate for 
the Court to engage in hindsight."); W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or 
she has been taught at trial about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time 
the invention was made .... "). 
34. For example, Rachlinski notes that the Supreme Court's invocation of "secondary 
considerations" in Graham v John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966), stemmed, at least in part, 
from the Court's desire to neutralize the hindsight bias. See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 
614. 
35. See Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Deci­
sions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIRCUIT BJ. 151, 163-68 (1995). Historically, the invalidation rate 
was even higher. For example, between 1921 and 1973, district courts invalidated 55% of the 
patents challenged, and the courts of appeals invalidated 65%. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond 
Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1140 n.241 (1989). 
36. In fact, several leading commentators have questioned the wisdom of reliance on 
secondary considerations in determining nonobviousness. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. 
REV. 803, 823-24 (1988) (noting that commercial success is not a reliable test of the 
nonobviousness of the invention). Factors such as commercial success and other secondary 
considerations may often be poor indications of the obviousness of an invention. 
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an advantage over the other, perhaps because it has superior human 
resources, it invests more in R&D, or it started research earlier. 
In order to analyze the effects of preemptive publication on sym­
metric and asymmetric public races, I will construct, in the following 
Sections, a game theoretic model of a patent race. Through the 
model, I will compare conventional theorizing of patent races - one 
that ignores preemptive publication - with one that takes preemptive 
publication into account. 
A. Model of a Symmetric Race 
To illustrate the impact of preemptive publication on patent races, 
it is helpful to think of a simple inventive setting in which two firms 
compete for a patent. For example, one can imagine two new phar­
maceutical firms, A and B, engaged in a competition for a new drug. 
To conduct research for the new drug, each firm must invest $1 ini­
tially, and then, depending on the outcome of the first stage of re­
search, it may choose to invest another $1 to conduct additional re­
search. After two stages of research, each firm has to choose among 
three options: file for a patent, publish its research results, or do 
nothing (namely, keep its results secret), with the decision depending 
on the research results each firm ultimately obtains. Assume that if 
one of the firms receives a patent, it will obtain sole possession of the 
market and will make a monopoly profit of $20. The other firm, in 
this case, will earn no profit, as the patent will legally bar it from pro­
ducing the drug. Thus, the payoff to the patenting firm is $20, and the 
payoff to the loser is $0. 
Assume further that if either firm can bar its rival from obtaining a 
patent by publishing its research results, the two firms will divide the 
market evenly with each of them making a duopoly profit of $8.37 
Thus, the symmetric payoff in the case of publication is $8.38 The as­
sumption here is that by removing the legal barrier of the patent, the 
publishing firm will be able, at a later stage, to manufacture the new 
drug, which, in turn, will enable it to share the market with the other 
firm and earn a positive profit.39 The model also accounts for the pos-
37. This assumption that a monopoly profit is higher than twice the duopoly profit is 
consistent both with the Bertrand model and the Cornot model of duopoly (assuming linear 
demand curve and constant marginal cost). In reality, the payoff of the competing firms 
from publication may be much lower than the duopoly profit Publication enables all comers 
to use the information published and thus benefits all firms currently on the market as well 
as potential entrants. 
38. As explained below, I assume that a firm will choose to publish only if its rival will 
otherwise receive a patent. In other words, a firm will publish only if by so doing it will spoil 
a patent to its rival. If neither firm obtained sufficient research results to file for a patent, 
neither will publish. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
39. In reality, the firm that was on the verge of patenting will have an advantage over its 
rival because it will have the advantage of being first on the market. Thus, the payoffs of the 
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sibility that neither firm yields sufficient research results to produce 
the new drug - namely, the possibility of a failed attempt - in which 
case each firm will earn a payoff of $0 and lose its investment in R&D 
(either $1 or $2). 
I will represent the race for the new drug as a simple, highly styl­
ized, die-game between the two competing firms. Because luck plays 
such an important role in the inventive process, it is useful to analogize 
patent races to die-games. Imagine that instead of conducting re­
search, the two competing firms engage in a die-game in which a $1 
investment (representing the investment in R&D) buys them one roll 
of a special die with the number 1 on three of its faces, and the num­
ber 4 on the remaining three. Thus, every roll yields a 0.5 probability 
of getting a 1, and a 0.5 probability of getting a 4. Assume that the 
numbers 1 and4 represent innovation increments. Accordingly, a roll 
of 4 enables a firm to improve on the prior art by four innovation in­
crements, and a roll of 1 by one innovation increment. To obtain a 
patentable result - a result that is both novel and nonobvious - un­
der this game, a firm needs to attain a total of at least 6 innovation in­
crements.40 Any lesser result (a total of 2 or 5) will fail to satisfy the 
obviousness standard. 
Finally, assume that the game proceeds in two rounds of four 
stages. At stage I, each firm must decide whether to invest $1 to earn 
the right to roll. At stage II, each firm that decided to invest gets to 
roll the die. At stage III, each firm learns of the other firm's result. 
Finally, at stage IV, each firm decides whether to "move" - patent, 
publish, or do nothing - or play another round for an additional cost 
of $1. 
I will analyze the probable outcomes of the game under two legal 
regimes: a regime that ignores the possibility of publication, and a re­
gime that takes publication into account. Under the first regime, 
which prohibits preemptive publication, a patent will issue any time 
one or more firms attain a total of 6 or more,41 and nothing will hap­
pen otherwise. Under the second regime, a patent will issue only 
when either firm attains a total of at least 6 and the other firm cannot 
block the patent by publishing its results (namely, when one firm at­
tains 8 and the other has 2 or less); or when both attain a total of 6 or 
more. Under this regime, a firm will elect to publish whenever doing 
firms may in many cases not be identical. This, however, does not affect the generality of the 
results of the model, since the main point here is that publication may yield a positive payoff 
to the firm trailing in the race. 
40. Or, more precisely, to patent under this game, a firm needs a 4 on both rolls (a total 
ofS). 
41. If both firms attained a total of 8 they will divide the patent evenly between them . 
Or, put differently, each firm will get the whole of the patent with equal probability. For 
instance, they may flip a coin, or even roll a die, to decide which firm will receive the patent. 
Thus, they will each earn a profit of $10. 
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so spoils a patent for its rival - namely, when publication will prevent 
the rival from attaining the necessary six increment margin over the 
prior art. If a fintt can neither patent nor block the issuance of a pat­
ent to its rival, it will choose to do nothing.42 The equilibria of the 
game under a "no-publication regime" are listed in Table 1, and the 
equilibria of the game under a regime with publication are listed in 
Table2. 
TABLE 1: SYMMETRIC GAME WITHOUT PREEMPTIVE Pu13LICATION43 
Probability that a patent will issue 
Probability that neither will obtain a patent 
Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure 
Average expected payoff for each firm 
0.4375 
0.5625 
$3.000 
$2.875 
TABLE 2: SYMMETRIC GAME WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION44 
Probability that a patent will issue 
Probability of preemptive publication 
Probability of neither a patent nor publication 
Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure 
Average expected payoff for each firm 
0.1875 
0.2500 
0.5625 
$3.500 
$2.125 
A comparison of the two games reveals several important results. 
First, the introduction of the option of preemptive publication did not 
result in a decrease in R&D activity. On the contrary, the introduc­
tion of preemptive publication led to a higher total investment in 
R&D ($3.5 versus $3). Preemptive publication makes this possible 
42. Thus, in a race without publication, a firm that rolls a 1 on its first turn will drop out 
after spending $1 on R&D because it cannot possibly obtain a patent. ("Doing nothing" also 
enables a firm to maintain trade secrecy protection.) In a race with publication, however, a 
firm rolling a 1 on its first turn will still have an incentive to remain in the race if its oppo­
nent has rolled a 4. The firm will spend the extra $1 to try and preempt its rival, thereby 
earning a possible stake in the market 
43. Of the 7/16 possible permutations in which either firm rolls an 8, each firm obtains 
the patent 3 times outright, whereas they will split the single remaining possibility. Further­
more, because a firm has a 0.5 chance of rolling a 1 on its first turn, each firm will spend an 
average of $1.50 on R&D. Therefore, the average expected payoff is: [(-$1.50) + (3/16)($20) 
+ (1/16)($10)] = $2.875. 
44. With preemptive publication, the rival firm will preemptively publish, thus thwarting 
4 of the 7 chances to obtain a patent; therefore, each firm has a 1/16 chance of winning the 
patent outright, and a 1/16 chance of splitting the patent Because a firm rolling a 1 will 
spend an extra $1 whenever its rival rolls a 4, each firm will spend an average of $1.75 on 
R&D. Therefore, the average expected payoff for each firm is: [(-$1.75) + (4/16)($8) + 
(1/16)($20) + (1116)($10)] = $2.125. 
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because the firm that initially obtained poor research results has an in­
centive to carry on with the research in the hope of spoiling a patent 
for its rival by obtaining publishable results at some later stage. As 
the model illustrates, in a game without publication, the dominant 
strategy for a firm getting a 1 on the first roll is to quit after this round. 
Not so in a game that allows for publication since a roll of 4 gives it a 
positive payoff.45 Consequently, the availability of preemptive publi­
cation in this setting produces additional investment originating with 
the trailing firm; thus, when preemptive publication is allowed, we 
should expect a higher level of expenditure on R&D from firms that 
would otherwise quit the race. 
Second, under both regimes new information is disclosed to the 
public 43.75% of the time. This implies that the introduction of pre­
emptive publication does not necessarily diminish the amount of in­
formation made available to the public. Yet, while under the first re­
gime information is always disclosed with the societal deadweight cost 
resulting from patent protection, the second regime imposes a dead­
weight loss only 18.75% of the time, while disclosing information 25% 
of the time at no societal cost. Furthermore, when the disclosure re­
sults from publication rather than from patent protection, the informa­
tion may be used costlessly by other firms for their respective research 
projects. Hence, preemptive publication reduces the cost of informa­
tion to society and other firms. 
Preemptive publication also has the salutary effect of shifting the 
timing of disclosure. As explained earlier, the stage at which a firm 
may publish always precedes the stage at which it may file for a patent. 
Publication becomes possible when a firm possesses sufficient theo­
retical knowledge to enable an invention. Patenting requires reduc­
tion of this knowledge to practice. In addition, a firm choosing to pat­
ent must also satisfy the necessary legal requirements for obtaining a 
patent. Hence, even from the inventor's point of view, there is a time 
lag between the publication stage and the patenting stage. From a so­
cietal standpoint, however, the lag is much greater. The information 
contained in a patent application becomes available to the public only 
after the Patent Office examines the patent and approves it. The ex­
amination takes 18 months, on average, and is conducted under abso­
lute secrecy.46 As a result, information in publications reaches the 
market considerably earlier than does information in patent applica-
45. Of course, in reality the decision of how much R&D to conduct ultimately depends 
on the value of the patent Still, in a "winner take all" game, a firm that fell behind in the 
early stages of research may rationally decide to drop out of the race since its probability of 
ultimately beating its rivals may not justify the additional investment in R&D. Formally this 
happens when X> P(Pt). 
46. See Scott Erickson, Patent Law and New Product Development: Does Priority Claim 
Basis Makes a Difference?, 36 AM. Bus. LJ. 327, 336 {1999) (noting that the average proc­
essing time of a patent application in the United States is eighteen months). 
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tions.47 The sooner new information becomes public, the sooner it 
may be put to valuable uses, and, consequently, the more socially 
valuable it is. 
Finally, it should be noted that the possibility of preemptive publi­
cation reduces the average expected payoff of the firms in the race 
(from $2.875 to $2.125). This indicates that the introduction of pre­
emptive publication may erode the incentive to engage in patent races, 
and more generally in R&D. Thus, at the margin, the possibility of 
preemptive publication may deter firms from initiating certain re­
search projects, and thus adversely affect innovation. 
B. Model of an Asymmetric Race 
To make the game more closely resemble commercial reality, I will 
assume in this Section that the firms in the race diverge in their likeli­
hoods of obtaining the patent. The difference may be due to superior 
human resources, higher investment in R&D, or an earlier start on the 
research. Each gives a firm an advantage over its opponents, increas­
ing its chance of winning the race. To incorporate the divergence be­
tween the firms into the model, I will assume in this Section that firm 
B - the better endowed firm - rolls a loaded die with a 0.67 prob­
ability of yielding 4 and 0.33 probability of yielding 1,48 while firm A 
rolls a die yielding 1 and 4 with equal probability. The higher prob­
ability of drawing a 4 - that is, of reaching a patentable result - is 
the only difference between the games; the payoffs of the players, the 
play order, and the decision menu remain the same. Once again, I will 
solve the game under two legal regimes, one that does not take publi­
cation into account and one that does. The equilibria of the game 
without publication are listed in Table 3, and the equilibria of the 
game with publication are listed in Table 4. 
47. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech­
nology Research, 'J7 YALE LJ. 177, 207 (1987) {"Patent disclosure is unlikely to occur until 
after a patent issues, which is often years later than disclosure to the scientific community 
would otherwise occur." (citation omitted)). 
48. This will happen when the number 4 appears on four of the faces of the die, and the 
number 1 only on two. 
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TABLE 3: ASYMMETRIC GAME WITIIOUT 
PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION49 
Probability that a patent will issue 
Probability that neither will obtain a patent 
Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure 
Average expected payoff A, B 
0.5833 
0.4167 
$3.167 
$2.389, $6.108 
TABLE 4: ASYMMETRIC GAME WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION50 
Probability that a patent will issue 
Probability that neither will obtain a patent 
Probability of neither a patent nor publication 
Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure 
Average expected payoff A, B 
0.2500 
0.3333 
0.4167 
$3.667 
$2.500, $4.164 
Analyzing the equilibria of the game reveals that the introduction 
of asymmetry impacts the race in two ways. First, it slightly increases 
the publication-to-patenting ratio relative to the symmetric game. 
Such an increase should be expected whenever the firm leading the 
race is likely to receive the patent. The more likely the leading firm 
will obtain a patent, the more valuable becomes the strategy of pre­
emptive publication to the trailing firm. Since spoiling a patent to a 
rival is both easier and less expensive than beating the rival to the pat­
ent, the firm trailing in the race will focus its efforts on obtaining pub­
lishable results to block a patent for the other firm. 
49. A patent will issue in 21/36 possible two roll permutations (given the weighted die) 
- 12 times to firm B, 5 times to firm A, and 4 times it will be split. Because firm B has a 2/3 
chance of rolling a 4, it will spend the full $2 two·thirds of the time. Thus, unlike firm A 
which will maintain the $1.500 expenditure, firm B will spend an average of $1.667. The to­
tal expected payoff for firm A will be: [(·$1.50) + (5/36)($20) +(4/36)($10)) = $2.389. The 
total expected payoff for firm B will be: [(-$1.67) + (12/36)($20) + (4/36)($10)) = $6.108. 
50. Firm A will be able to preempt 2/3 of B's patents, thus giving B a patent only 6/36 
times, while forcing a duopoly profit 8/36 times. Firm B, on the other hand, will be able to 
preempt 4/5 of A's patents, leaving A with a patent 1/36 times, while forcing a duopoly profit 
4136 times. Furthermore, both A and B will spend the same amount on R&D, choosing to 
pay the extra dollar 5/6 of the time. Thus, each spends an average of $1.833 on R&D. As 
compared with the asymmetric race without publication, firm B loses [(8/36)($12) + ($1.833 • 
$1.667)] = $2.833, while it gains (4/36)($8) = $0.889 from preempting firm A. Thus, its total 
expected payoff is: [$6.108 + $0.889 · $2.833) = $4.164. Firm A, however, loses only 
[(4/36)($12) + ($1.833 • $1.500)) = $1.667, but gains (8/36)($8) = $1.778. Thus, its total ex­
pected payoff is: [$2.389 + $1.778 • $1.667) = $2.500. 
February 2000) Publish or Perish 943 
Second, a comparison of the expected average payoffs of the firms 
shows that the introduction of publication reduces the average payoff 
of the superior firm, far more than it does the payoff of the inferior 
firm. In fact, in the above scenario, firm B suffered over a 30% drop 
in its average expected payoff, whereas firm A enjoyed an almost 5 %  
gain.51 This result confirms the intuition that preemptive publication 
advantages the firm trailing in the race. The firm leading the race will 
choose, in most cases, the option of patenting - particularly if it em­
ploys superior researchers and faces no financing constraints. For 
such a firm, publishing is self-defeating. For the trailing firm, on the 
other hand, publication is often the profit-maximizing strategy. 
The disparate impact of preemptive publication on the average ex­
pected payoffs of the firms has both distributive and efficiency impli­
cations. From a distributive standpoint, the availability of preemptive 
publication transforms patent races from a "winner take all" to a 
"multiple winner" race, making patent races more egalitarian than 
commonly believed. From an efficiency perspective, the exact effect 
depends on the potential race participants' attitude towards risk. If 
inventors are risk averse, they will be more willing to participate in 
patent races. If, on the other hand, they are risk seeking, they will 
have less motivation to join.52 Finally, if the firms are risk neutral, 
they will simply respond to the decline in average expected payoffs by 
lowering their investment in R&D. (Of course, all three kinds of 
companies would lower their R&D investment. Their relative disposi­
tions therefore determine "by how much?".) Yet, the reduction made 
by each of the firms will be different. 
The sharper decline in the expected average payoff of the leading 
firm suggests that when publication is available, the firms most likely 
to win the race will invest substantially less in R&D than under a no­
publication regime. It is impossible, however, to infer in the abstract 
how this reduction will actually affect social welfare; it is impossible to 
know whether the advantage of the leading firm is attributable to its 
superior research ability, better financing, initial headstart, or simply 
luck. The exact impact of preemptive publication on efficiency ulti­
mately turns on the circumstances of each inventive race and the char­
acteristics of the competing firms. All that can be predicted is that in 
the very rare case in which all firms start the race at the same time, the 
possibility of preemptive publication will tend to favor smaller, lesser­
endowed firms relative to their larger, better-endowed competitors.53 
51. Whether and how much of an increase the inferior firm will realize with the possi­
bility of preemptive publication depends on the relative advantage of the superior firm. 
52. For an argument that participants in patent races are risk seeking, see John S. 
McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J L & ECON. 135, 136 
(1966). 
53. However, even in this case, the smaller firm may serendipitously get to the invention 
first. 
. 
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Ill. PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
In analyzing the welfare effects of preemptive publication, I will 
proceed under two alternative assumptions. First, I will assume that 
no bargaining between the competing firms is possible, and thus the 
firm trailing in the race will always publish the information it possesses 
when doing so spoils a patent for the other firm. Then, I will reverse 
the initial assumption to enable bargaining between the firms prior to 
the act of publication. 
A No Bargaining Regime 
Recognizing the availability of preemptive publication reveals sev­
eral implications for our understanding of the welfare effects of the 
patent system. The realization that in many cases utility-maximizing 
firms, acting in their own self-interest, may choose to make valuable 
information available to the public even without receiving a patent 
challenges the conventional assumption that the patent system induces 
disclosure of information solely through a limited monopoly reward. 
As this Article demonstrates, the threat of not being rewarded -
namely, not receiving a patent - may be as effective an inducement to 
disclose information as the prospect of reward. In the former case, the 
disclosure occurs through a regular publication, in the latter, through 
the patent grant. It bears emphasis, though, that the two means of dis­
closure have different efficiency effects. 
Publication avoids the societal deadweight loss generated by pat­
ents since it makes the information available at no direct cost. Signifi­
cantly, it circumvents the troublesome tradeoff underlying patent law: 
new information in exchange for limited monopoly power. Further­
more, disclosure by publication allows third parties to exploit the new 
information considerably earlier than they could in the case of disclo­
sure by patent. Also, the absence of patent protection obviates the 
need to bargain for the right to use the information, and thus reduces 
transaction costs. Yet, the effect of preemptive publication on societal 
welfare is not strictly positive. The availability of preemptive publica­
tion reduces the expected average payoffs of the race participants and 
may consequently diminish, in some cases, the ex ante incentive to en­
gage in R&D.54 In addition, the possibility of preemptive publication 
forces race participants to expend resources on monitoring the prog­
ress of other competitors. Rather than focusing all research efforts on 
developing the invention, firms will have to divide those efforts be­
tween conducting their own research and monitoring competitors' re­
search activities. Although such monitoring is not entirely wasteful, it 
54. The exact impact of preemptive publication depends on the competing firms' atti­
tudes towards risk. 
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is an additional cost that will slow down the development of new 
products and processes. Thus, preemptive publication represents a 
tradeoff between ex ante and ex post efficiency, a tradeoff that has be­
come the hallmark of intellectual property law. 
Notwithstanding this tradeoff, preemptive publication is likely to 
promote societal welfare in at least two inventive settings. First, the 
strategy of preemptive publication offers strong benefits in research 
areas whose development depends on uninhibited access to basic re­
search. Biotechnology provides an example55 - publication of re­
search findings ensures access to basic research results and thus miti­
gates the threat of overappropriation of essential knowledge.56 A 
similar effect may be expected in other fields as well. Because patent 
races will more likely occur with respect to socially important inven­
tions, recourse to preemptive publication may block the appropriation 
of fundamental developments and force firms to compete for variants 
of such inventions, or, as they are called in the patent vernacular, im­
provements. 
Second, and relatedly, preemptive publication should be particu­
larly desirable when network effects are present. Network effects ex­
ist in a market when the value of the good traded increases with the 
number of users.57 The paradigmatic examples of network goods are 
communication goods, such as telephones, fax machines, and even 
personal computers. The realization of network externalities depends 
on the establishment of compatible technologies. Without such a 
standard, potential networks will not come to pass. For instance, if 
Internet Service Providers used different, incompatible technological 
standards, the Internet, as we know it, would not exist. Patents pose 
an obvious threat to network markets. The appropriation of a certain 
technology by one firm will often force other firms to develop other, 
incompatible technologies in order to circumvent the patent.58 In the 
process, potential positive network effects will be lost. Preemptive 
publication can alleviate some of this problem. Specifically, preemp-
55. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing that the recent 
proliferation of fragmented intellectual property rights may result in a biomedical anticom­
mons, which will lead, in turn, to underuse of resources and knowledge). 
56. In fact, the field of biotechnology developed around two basic discoveries for which 
no patent protection was claimed. The first was Kohler and Milstein's discovery of a tech­
nique of producing antibodies. The second was Cohen and Boyer's discovery of a technique 
for expression of recombinant proteins. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 905-06 (1990). 
57. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com­
patibility, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). For a comprehensive analysis of the potential 
implications of network externalities to various legal fields, see Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). 
58. On the relationship between networks and innovation, see Joseph Farrel & Gather 
Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985). 
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tive publication may be used to safeguard against the appropriation of 
basic technological standards and thus facilitate the creation of tech­
nological networks. 
Furthermore, the availability of preemptive publication also bears 
directly on the question of optimizing R&D investment. Several 
leading economists have criticized the patent system for inducing 
overinvestment in R&D.59 However, the criticism relies on the con­
ventional assumption that firms in a patent race face only the risk of 
being beaten to the patent (Type I risk). In reality, firms also face the 
risk of preemptive publication (Type II risk). By ignoring the possi­
bility of preemptive publication, conventional theorizing has underes­
timated the actual risk involved in patent races and, as a result, may 
have overstated the overinvestment problem.60 
Although one might intuit that the availability of preemptive pub­
lication would mitigate the overinvestment problem, the exact effect 
of preemptive publication on R&D investment is indeterminable in 
the abstract. The possibility of preemptive publication is at once a risk 
and an opportunity, depending on the firm's position in the race. For 
the firm likely to win the race, preemptive publication represents a 
risk; for the other firms, it is an opportunity. In perfectly symmetric 
races, where luck determines the winner and the loser, the opposing 
effects of preemptive publication offset one another.61 Yet, because 
the availability of preemptive publication reduces the average ex­
pected payoffs, both the winner and the loser should invest less in 
R&D than they would otherwise. 
In asymmetric races the situation is different. In such races, the 
strategy of preemptive publication presents trailing firms with a 
unique opportunity to remain competitive without winning the patent. 
The availability of preemptive publication may induce firms that 
would otherwise drop out of the race to remain in it; worse, it may at­
tract to patent races firms that otherwise would not have entered them 
at all. Whereas from the point of view of each individual firm, joining 
the race might be a profit-enhancing strategy, it is clearly wasteful in 
the aggregate, since it leads to duplicative research expenditures. This 
59. See, e.g., Yoram Barze!, Optimal Timing of Inventions, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 
(1968); Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 13-14; Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social 
Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 571-72 
(1971); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Re­
search Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 703 (1983) (asserting that unlimited patents will 
lead to overinvestment in R&D). 
60. Note, however, that this Article does not suggest that there is no overinvestment 
problem. That is a complex question that lies beyond the scope of this Article. I claim only 
that because of the risk of preemptive publication, the amount of overinvestment may be 
smaller than presently believed. 
61. In such races, no firm can know ex ante whether it will be harmed or benefited by 
the availability of preemptive publication. 
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observation lends support to the criticism that the patent system leads 
to overinvestment in R&D. Importantly, however, it identifies a new 
source of overinvestment: the desire to preempt a rival. 
But what about the leading firm? The leading firm's motivation in 
patent races is different from that of the others. Generally speaking, 
the leader's profit-maximizing strategy is to try and win; that of the 
other firms is simply not to lose. Hence, for the leading firm the pos­
sibility of preemptive publication offers a potential risk. The leading 
firm can respond to the risk of preemptive publication in one of two 
opposing ways. First, it may increase its investment in R&D in order 
to obtain the patent faster and thus minimize the risk of preemption. 
Second, it may lower its investment in R&D out of fear of being pre­
empted. In the latter case, the availability of preemptive publication 
leads to a perverse result: it reduces the R&D investment of the firm 
most likely to win the race, while it increases the investment of other 
firms.62 This result may explain the disparity between the private 
value and social value of certain inventions.63 
The possibility of preemptive publication potentially transforms 
patent races from competitions for one large prize into competitions 
with multiple prizes. The exact number of "winners" ultimately de­
pends on the respective research capabilities of the firms, the time at 
which they joined the race, and the "size" of the legal nonobviousness 
standard. The respective payoffs to the firms depend on both the 
value of the patent and the returns from preemptive publication. The 
availability of bargaining also bears on the payoffs of firms in patent 
races. It is to this factor that I now turn. 
62. This result is made possible by the imperfect information firms have about their po­
tential competitors. Having insufficient information about its competitors, the leading firm 
may overestimate its own ability to beat its competitor to the patent, or merely to beat its 
competitor's publication. The strategy of increasing the investment runs the risk of being 
undercapitalized in future projects if the firm is ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining the pat­
ent. 
However, it is important to note that the risk of preemptive publication is by no means 
the only reason for the observed disparity between the private and social value of certain 
inventions. Nor is it the most significant one. The main reason for this disparity is the im­
perfect enforceability of patents. Because patents are not perfectly enforceable, patents 
generate spillovers. While this result is desirable ex post, it undermines the ex ante incentive 
of inventors to invest in R&D and thus drives a wedge between the social value of the inven­
tion and its private value. Cf. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market 
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and 
Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that encouraging limited 
amounts of patent infringement while extending patent duration may "substantially reduce 
the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's 
ex ante incentives to innovate"). 
63. See, e.g., Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: 
Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742, 753 (1986); Michael 
Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 QJ. ECON. 1137, 
1141 (1998); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Inno­
vations, 91 QJ. ECON. 221, 234 (1977). 
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B. Enter Bargaining 
The availability of bargaining introduces an important element 
into the analysis.64 Rather than spoiling a patent to a rival by publish­
ing its research results, the trailing firm can contact the leader and 
threaten to publish. Since such a threat may clearly be credible, the 
recipient will not be able simply to ignore it and will have to inquire 
into the nature of the threat. If the threat is credible, the intended 
patentee will have to "bribe" the other firm to prevent it from pub­
lishing. The two firms will then negotiate in order to strike a mutually 
beneficial deal. Assuming Coasean bargaining under conditions of 
equal bargaining power, the intended publisher and intended patentee 
will divide the contractual surplus evenly between them. Under the 
assumptions of the model in Section II.B, the amount of the "bribe" in 
such a case would be $10.65 While this side-payment is a pure lump­
sum transfer that does not affect the marginal cost of producing the 
patented product, it does affect the average expected payoffs of the 
firms. 
When the possibility of Coasean bargaining is introduced into the 
asymmetric race in Section II.B, the expected average payoff of the 
better-endowed firm - firm B in the model - is $4.84, and that of 
firm A is $3.17. As one would expect, the availability of bargaining in­
creases the payoffs of the firms relative to a regime with publication 
but no bargaining - in which case, the expected payoffs of firms A 
and B are $2.500 and $4.165, respectively. Thus, the introduction of 
bargaining mitigates to some extent the effect of preemptive publica­
tion on the investment decisions of the firms.66 
Bargaining may either occur ex ante, before research begins, or ex 
post, after the firms assume their respective positions in the race. The 
main advantage of ex ante bargaining is that it allows firms to consoli­
date otherwise duplicative research efforts. Rather than competing 
head-on against each other, risking the possibility of preemption, firms 
64. Again, the analysis in this Section does not address the various antitrust ramifica­
tions of coordinated R&D. Negotiations between firms to coordinate may violate the 
Sherman Act depending on the market power of the participants and the importance of the 
research. Yet, the exact antitrust implications of coordinated research cannot be determined 
in the abstract. 
65. Under this model, payoffs in the case of a patent are $20 to the patenting firm and $0 
to the other firm. The payoff in the case of publication is $8 to each of the firms. Thus, un­
der an assumption of equal bargaining powers, the intended patentees will have to pay the 
other firm 8 + 05(12 - 8) = 10. Formally, the result of this bargaining game can be described 
as follows: Let denote bargaining power such that 0 < < 1. For any , the amount of the 
side-payment would be 8 + (4). A necessary condition of bargaining in this case is that the 
payoff from publication be smaller than half the value of the patent. 
66. Yet, even after the introduction of bargaining, the average expected payoffs of the 
firms are lower than what they would be without publication - in which case, the expected 
payoffs of firms A and B are $2.388 and $6.277, respectively. 
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may identify their strongest rivals in advance and try to cooperate with 
them. Such cooperation holds out several benefits for the firms and 
for society at large. From the firms' perspective, consolidation of re­
search efforts increases the likelihood of success in R&D while low­
ering the cost of research.67 Both effects are also desirable from a so­
cietal standpoint. Coordination of research efforts not only increases 
the likelihood of success, but also enhances the speed of research and 
the dissemination of information. The earlier a patent issues, the 
sooner society receives new information. Likewise, the cost reduction 
wrought by consolidated research economizes on valuable resources, 
freeing them for other desirable goals. Yet, the possibility of Coasean 
bargaining has its vices. 
Coasean bargaining delays the disclosure of information to the 
public relative to a "no bargaining" regime, and when the information 
is finally disclosed, it happens at the cost of social deadweight loss as­
sociated with patent protection. Thus, Coasean bargaining effectively 
eliminates the potential ex post benefits of preemptive publication -
under Coasean bargaining no publication would ever occur. Impor­
tantly, however, there are powerful reasons to believe that Coasean 
bargaining is not very likely in the present context. 
For Coasean bargaining to occur, firms must possess perfect in­
formation about each other's research plans and accomplishments. 
Such perfect information, however, would only be available if research 
activity were completely transparent. This is far from the case in the 
real world. In fact, firms actively protect information about their 
R&D efforts, even taking special precautions to prevent inadvertent 
leaks. As Arrow demonstrated in explaining the need for patent pro­
tection, bargaining over unprotected information is very unlikely to 
occur.68 The stakes involved are simply too high. Furthermore, in the 
absence of transparency, firms will often be unable to ascertain which 
publication threats are real and which are not. A firm that agreed to 
pay off one competitor may find itself inundated with threats from 
others, all requiring the same treatment.69 Sifting out the real from the 
fake threats may often turn out to be impossible, and almost always 
67. Because ex ante contracting occurs before costs are sunk, it lowers the cost of 
achieving cooperation relative to ex post negotiations. It should be noted, however, that ex 
ante coordination may give rise to potential antitrust liability for the firms involved. 
68. Specifically, Arrow identified the following problem: Without disclosing the infor­
mation she obtains, the initial holder will not be able to sell or license it to potential buyers; 
but once the information has been disclosed, she has nothing left to sell or license. See 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF lNvENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962). 
69. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1305-06 (1996) (demonstrating 
the inability of intellectual property owners to distinguish between credible and noncredible 
threats of infringements). 
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too time-consuming. Thus, it will likely be in the patenting firm's best 
interest not to bargain at all, even if doing so runs the risk of being 
preempted. 
Advance coordination in the form of joint ventures avoids some of 
the pitfalls of ex post bargaining, but it too is not problem-free. Since 
collaborating with all potential preemptors is impracticable, each firm 
would have to choose its research partners carefully. However, identi­
fying the right research partners is a tricky task, and the excluded 
firms may respond by forming rival coalitions to remain competitive. 
Thus, although coordination benefits society by reducing the number 
of duplicative research efforts, it does not necessarily eliminate the 
risk of preemptive publication. At the end of the day, bargaining and 
cooperation will not always assuage the risk of preemptive publica­
tion. 
IV. THE DOUBLE PREEMPTION TwlST 
In order to shelter itself from the risk of preemption, the intended 
patentee can employ the defense tactic of publishing its own research 
results and then filing for a patent within one year of the date of publi­
cation. Section 102(b) of the Patent Act grants a one-year grace pe­
riod in which the publisher can file for a patent, thus effectively ena­
bling the patentee to preempt the preemptor. The one-year grace 
period established by § 102(b) has traditionally been understood to 
encourage early disclosure of information by patent applicants.70 Yet, 
the traditional rationale makes very little sense when the possibility of 
preemptive publication is ignored. Section 102(b) provides patent ap­
plicants with a very limited incentive to disclose earlier. Granted, 
early disclosure enables firms to gain a better estimate of the value of 
the invention prior to the patent's approval, to enter licensing agree­
ments, and to satisfy the desire of researchers to publish as early as 
possible. Yet, absent a more substantial inducement, foregoing publi­
cation is actually the better option for patent applicants, since publica­
tion divests them of the natural protection of secrecy. Because inven­
tors can never be certain of receiving the patent, their profit­
maximizing strategy at this point is not to publish. Not only does early 
publication force them to file within one year, it also provides impor­
tant information to rivals. Furthermore, because § 102(b) is uniquely 
American, early publication will hurt the publishing firms in foreign 
markets. Hence, when preemptive publication is ignored, § 102(b) 
seems puzzling. 
70. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d SS, 61 {Ct. a. 1981) (stating 
that one of the rationales for enacting the section is a "policy favoring prompt and wide­
spread disclosure of new inventions to the public"); see also Patrick J. Barrett, Note, New 
Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730, 732-35 
(1972). 
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The possibility of preemptive publication solves the puzzle by pro­
viding the inducement wanting in the traditional rationale. Faced with 
the possibility of being preempted, the intended patentee may find it 
in her best interest to publish first so as to neutralize the risk of publi­
cation by a rival. Publishing first eliminates the risk of preemption, 
but only at the cost _ of loss of secrecy. Consequently, in deciding 
whether or not to publish prior to filing, the intended patentee must 
evaluate the risk of preemption against the risk of failing to receive 
the patent,71 and respond to the more imminent one. Patentees will, 
therefore, publish only if doing so is necessary to preempt publication 
by a rival. 
· 
An early publication by a patent applicant benefits society by 
moving forward the date of disclosure. In the absence of such a publi­
cation, the patentee will reveal the information to the public only 
when the patent issues, which in most cases will delay disclosure by 
approximately a year and a half.72 The early disclosure, in the case of 
publication, enables other firms to put the information to new valu­
able uses sooner than they otherwise could and, in particular, to start 
developing improvements. Because in most cases the information dis­
closed by patent applicants will become protected by a patent less than 
a year after the date of publication, however, users will face the need 
to negotiate a mutually agreeable deal with the patent grantee. As a 
result, early publication by patent applicants does not provide free ac­
cess to the information contained in the publication. Even so, earlier 
disclosure is welfare-enhancing as it accelerates the pace of innova­
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this Article has been to challenge the prevailing 
theory of patent races and its ability to aptly capture the inventive 
process. Standard theorizing models the inventive process as a race 
between two firms that results in one of two outcomes - neither firm 
reaches a patentable result, or one of the firms obtains the patent; no 
intermediate outcomes are considered. Yet, this analysis is flawed. 
While the firm ahead in the race will naturally do its best to obtain the 
patent and enjoy the legal monopoly that accompanies this achieve­
ment, the trailing firm will do whatever it can to prevent this from 
happening. To this end, the firm trailing in the race will utilize the 
71. A famous case that illustrates this point is In re O'Farrel, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). In this case, two of the three patent applicants had reported their research findings in 
a scientific paper that came out more than a year before the filing date. In determining the 
validity of the patent, the Federal Circuit ruled that because the publication occurred more 
than a year prior to the date of filings, it rendered the invention obvious, and thus precluded 
the patent. 
72. See Erickson, supra note 46. 
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only strategy the .Jaw makes available to it: it will publish its research 
findings in order to move the goalposts of nonobviousness for its rival. 
When this occurs, patent races may result in an equilibrium where no 
patent issues, but new information is disclosed. 
The strategy of preemptive publication significantly alters existing 
understanding of patent races and their efficiency effects. The avail­
ability of preemptive publication transforms patent races from a "win­
ner take all" to a "multiple winners" game. This transformation af­
fects the risk involved in patent races, the investment decisions of the 
firms, and the cost of innovation to both the firms and the public at 
large. As is often the case with patents, the tradeoff between ex ante 
and ex post efficiency implicated by patent protection makes it diffi­
cult to determine in the abstract whether, on balance, the impact of 
the availability of preemptive publication on aggregate efficiency is 
positive or negative. Thus, a more thorough understanding of the wel­
fare implications of preemptive publication requires empirical study. 
Yet, even the analysis presented in this Article has important norma­
tive implications for policymakers. 
Determining the correct nonobviousness standard is the key to ef­
ficient innovation policy. A modest nonobviousness requirement 
would inefficiently reward infinitesimal innovation. A higher 
nonobviousness standard would appear to serve society better by fil­
tering out relatively trivial inventions. Yet, as this Article shows, the 
possibility of preemptive publication changes the analysis. The higher 
the nonobviousness bar, the more likely preemptive publication will 
occur. Thus, courts must take into account the possibility of preemp­
tive publication in determining the socially optimal nonobviousness 
standard. Naturally, legislation may enhance or diminish the possibil­
ity for preemptive publication. For instance, requiring that publica­
tion occur at least a year prior to the date of invention in order to pre­
empt . the patent would reduce the opportunity for preemptive 
publication. Conversely, allowing such publication to occur any time 
prior to the filing date would enhance instances of preemptive publica­
tion. Moreover, different rules may be devised for different industries, 
depending on the desirability of preemptive publication in each inven­
tive setting. 
While these determinations are of extreme importance to innova­
tion policy, they lie outside of the purview of this Article. Yet, this 
Article's discussion of the various efficiency implications of preemp­
tive publication should prove helpful to policymakers in making those 
determinations. If the analysis in this Article is correct, it shows that, 
at the end of the day, the realities of patent races and academic pro­
motion are not so far apart. 
